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Abstract 
This paper provides an historical overview of aid flows to North Africa. It assesses the 
aid allocation process and argues that past aid flows to the region have been heavily 
influenced by donor political interests. This has reduced the effectiveness of aid which, 
with the exception of Tunisia, has not been associated with sustained economic growth. 
The Arab Spring provides an opportunity to reappraise aid flows to North Africa and it 
is argued that future flows need to support the democratization process, generate pro-
poor growth, support social safety nets and address the pressing issues of widening 
inequalities and unemployment. 
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1 Introduction 
The North Africa region, consisting of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, 
has, for many decades been the world’s largest recipient of foreign aid in per capita 
terms. Taken along with its neighbouring sub-region, namely, the Middle East to form 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa),1 the region is the third largest global recipient 
of aid in absolute terms, after Southern and Central Africa and Asia. However, aid to the 
MENA region is highly variable and much of the variation is driven by responses to 
conflicts within the region from bilateral donors. In addition to conflict, geopolitics 
more generally plays an important role in the aid allocation process to MENA. This is 
reflected in the fact that the share of bilateral aid to the region is comparatively high, 
such that the share of total aid accounted for by multilateral donors is lower in 
comparison to Central and Southern Africa and the largest single donor to the region is 
the US, accounting for on average 38 per cent of total bilateral aid between 1980 and 
2006. Donor interest, in the form of geopolitical and commercial considerations, are 
important in the aid relationship in MENA because the region itself is considered to be 
so geopolitically and commercially important by Western powers—conflict ridden, the 
centre of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the birth place of Al-Qaeda, and the source of much 
of the world’s oil supplies. 
The fact that donor interest has played a large role in the allocation of aid to North 
Africa and MENA more generally means that much of this aid has been ineffective. 
Although the region is diverse, overall it has not opened up or globalized (with the 
exception of some of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states such as Dubai) in 
comparison to other regions and remains restrictive and controlling in terms of political 
rights and civil liberties, with donors in the past propping up repressive and autocratic 
regimes, such as the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. For 
the North African economies, although there has been strong growth in recent years, 
with the exception of Tunisia, they have failed to generate sustained pro-poor growth or 
to diversify their narrow export base. As a result, they continue to face pressing 
socioeconomic problems, particularly high levels of unemployment and widening 
inequalities. This has contributed to the wave of political unrest sweeping the region in 
2011. In light of this there is considerable scope for future aid flows to re-orientate 
towards providing greater support for improvements in governance, civil society, 
employment generation and pro-poor growth. 
The next section of this paper provides an historical overview of aid flows to the MENA 
region, distinguishing where possible between the Middle East and North African sub-
regions. Section 3 assesses the extent to which donor interest as opposed to recipient 
                                                
1 The World Bank definition of MENA includes: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. It does not 
include the high-income countries of the Gulf, nor Israel and Turkey, nor Sudan and Mauritania which 
although predominantly Arab countries face challenges more typical of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In 
our general discussions of aid allocations we use the same country grouping as the Bank, although 
also include reference to Israel, a major recipient of US aid. Although Turkey could be considered part 
of MENA in political, cultural and geographic terms, and is also one of the most important countries 
in the region in terms of US foreign policy, it is not generally considered part of MENA in economic 
terms. This fact, along with close ties with Europe and moves to join the European Union in the near 
future, mean we have taken the standard definition of MENA and excluded Turkey from our analysis. 
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need has influenced the flow of aid to the region. The literature on this subject will be 
briefly reviewed and an empirical investigation based on a large panel dataset using 
regressions for different major donors to establish to what extent different donors 
respond to donor interest when allocating aid to specific recipients in the region. In light 
of the policy reform influence and signaling role of the IMF and World Bank the paper 
will also assess the economic and political determinants of IMF and World Bank 
programme loans to the Middle East and North Africa using both a qualitative and a 
quantitative analysis. The section concludes that donor interest has played a major role 
in the aid allocation process and that this may have had a detrimental effect on aid 
effectiveness as well as resulting in excessive amounts of aid flows to the region in light 
of its predominately middle-income status outside the GCC countries.  
Section 4 presents case studies of aid effectiveness in three North African recipients—
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia and more generally reviews the record of aid effectiveness 
in North Africa. The case studies suggest that, with the exception of Tunisia, aid has not 
been associated with sustained increases in pro-poor growth. Growth has been largely 
extensive rather than intensive, has failed to address the region’s pressing 
unemployment problem, and has been triggered by factors other than aid flows. Section 
5 concludes by looking forward to the ways in which future aid flows could help 
support the current political transition in the region by allocating more aid to 
governance activities and pro-poor growth strategies that address the issues of widening 
inequalities and unemployment.  
2 Historical trends in aid flows 
Figure 1 shows the standing of the North Africa and Middle East regions relative to 
other regions in terms of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) total net 
disbursements (the sum of grants, capital subscriptions and net loans—loans extended 
minus repayments of loan principal and offsetting entries for debt relief). For the 
MENA region as a whole the real value of ODA declined during the 1980s and 1990s 
such that by 2000 the annual average value was below that of 1980. This mirrors global 
trends in the flow of aid. Averages since 2000 show a recovery from the low of the 
1990s. Noteworthy also is the large spike in aid to MENA in 2005-06 which is 
accounted for by net debt relief to Iraq in 2005 and 2006. In 2005 net debt relief to Iraq 
amounted to US$14 billion, 63 per cent of total net ODA disbursements to the region, 
and in 2006 US$3 billion, or 39 per cent of total ODA. 
The historical trends in aid flows for the North Africa sub-region differ from those for 
MENA as a whole. North Africa has seen a trend decline in the real value of aid receipts 
between 1980 and 2009 such that by 2009 the annual real value of aid at US$1,971 
million was significantly below the real value of US$3,822 million in 1980. The 
temporary spike in 1991-92, with flows reaching US$7,651 in 1991, is largely 
accounted for by a rapid increase in flows to Egypt. In response to supporting the allies 
in the first Gulf War, Egypt received a large increase in aid flows as well as massive 
debt forgiveness of US$15 billion from the West, the highest debt forgiveness package 
in the history of MENA. 
The above analysis clearly shows not only that aid to the MENA region is variable but 
that much of the variation is driven by responses to conflicts within the region, with the 
two spikes in aid inflows, namely in the early 1990s and in 2005-06, largely explained 
by donors’ response to conflict rather than being a reflection of recipient need.  
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Figure 1 also shows that for most of the period the MENA region was the third largest 
global recipient of aid, after Southern and Central Africa and Asia, overtaking Asia in 
2005 to become the second largest recipient. Much of this aid flow however, is directed 
at the Middle East sub-region, such that North Africa, consisting of only a handful of 
countries, is below most other regions in terms of volume of aid receipts in the 2000s. 
Another important regional indicator of aid flows is aid per capita; this is shown in 
Figure 2. Making a regional comparison, the Middle East and North Africa (developing 
countries only) received the second largest amount of aid in per capita terms (US$41) in 
2009, surpassed only by SSA (US$53). Striking however, is the amount of aid per 
capita received by North Africa which exceeds that of any other region. In 2000 aid per 
capita for North Africa reached a low of US$63 (still significantly higher than for any 
other region). This steadily increased to reach US$100 per capita by 2009—nearly 
double that of SSA. The fact that North Africa receives such high levels of aid per 
capita suggests that aid flows are being influenced by factors other than pure recipient 
need, if the latter is proxied by income levels. Figure 3 shows total aid flows to MENA 
by income group. As can be seen, most aid flows in MENA are not to low-income 
countries but to lower-middle-income countries, with a not so insignificant amount also 
flowing to upper-middle-income countries. In terms of the North African countries, 
Algeria, Libya and Tunisia fall in the upper-middle-income group whist Egypt and 
Morocco fall in the lower-middle-income group. 
Figure 4 shows net ODA disbursements to the five North African countries. As can be 
seen Egypt is by far the largest recipient followed by the other lower-middle-income 
country, Morocco. Egypt’s favoured status in both absolute and per capita terms partly 
reflects the fact the Egypt is a key Western ally in the region and since the signing of the 
Camp David Peace Accord with Israel in the late 1970s has been a large recipient of aid 
from the US.  
Considering which are the key donors to the MENA region, Figures 5 and 6 show the 
dominance of bilateral over multilateral aid. This is not unexpected given the role 
played by geopolitical factors in aid flows to MENA, which have a much greater 
influence on bilateral as opposed to multilateral aid institutions (Maizels and Nissanke 
1984; Rodrik 1995). It also highlights that the source of variability over time is bilateral 
aid, as multilateral aid follows a constant, slightly increasing trend. Again, this is 
consistent with the fact that much bilateral aid is geopolitically motivated, responding to 
factors such as conflict in the region.  
Between 1980-89 the US was the single largest donor to the North Africa region, 
accounting for 37 per cent of total ODA to the region. Since the end of the 1980s the 
influence of European donors as a group has increased considerably at the expense of 
the USA. Figure 7 and Table 1 shows European and USA aid to the region for different 
time periods and illustrates the fact that since the 1980s the European share of aid flows 
has gradually increased such that by the 2000-09 period the total European share of aid 
(both multi and bilateral) was 69 per cent compared to a US share of only 17 per cent. 
France is the largest European bilateral donor to North Africa. Since the Barcelona 
Accord of 1995 European Union multilateral aid to the region has also been increasing 
as shown in Table 1 and Figure 7, such that by the 2000-09 period EU aid to North 
Africa accounted for 24 per cent of total flows.  
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3 The aid allocation process in MENA 
In terms of aid allocation MENA assumes both political and economic significance. 
Politically, it is arguably the epicentre of world crisis, chronically war-prone and the site 
of the world’s most protracted conflicts (Hinnebusch 2003: 1). Economically, it owns 
the bulk of the world’s oil reserves, driving in particular the USA economic engine. In 
light of the region’s geopolitically and economically strategic position in the world 
economy it is clear that economic and political factors are inextricably linked when it 
comes to the manner in which the West, particularly the USA, responds to the region’s 
needs.  
There is a long and rich theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of the 
geographical allocation of foreign aid.2 It is generally accepted that this allocation is 
influenced by both recipient need and donor interest and that multilateral aid is less 
susceptible to donor interest than bilateral aid (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Rodrik 
1995). In the past donor interest has often reflected the geopolitics of the Cold War, 
with pro-western regimes, regardless of economic need and their record on human 
rights, being large recipients of Western aid.3 
Even before the collapse of communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new theory 
was emerging to the effect that ‘Islam [is] the new Communism and [hence represents] 
a grave threat to Western civilization’ (Niva 1998: 27). Consequently, ‘rogue states’ 
were isolated whilst pro-Western regimes, particularly if they were threatened by 
Islamists, were rewarded for serving Western interests (Hubbell 1998: 9). Hence, the 
end of the Cold War replaced the old dichotomy in the Arab World between 
conservative pro-Western and socialist pro-communist Arab regimes with a new and 
less covert formula based on ‘friends or allies, or good or bad’ regimes (Perthes 1998: 
30).  
Donor interest seems to play a particularly significant role in aid allocation to MENA. 
Many aid allocation studies based on models which incorporate variables representing 
both donor interest4 and recipient need have reached the conclusion that donor interest 
is an important determinant of the geographic allocation of aid, especially on the part of 
bilateral donors (Jalée 1968; Frank 1969; Hayter 1971, 1981; Hensman 1971; McKinlay 
and Little 1977, 1978, 1979, Maizels and Nissanke 1984; McGillivray 2003; Feeny and 
McGillivray 2002; Berthélemy and Tichit 2002; Harrigan and Wang 2011). A number 
of these aid allocation studies introduce dummies to reflect specific strategic links 
between donors and certain recipients. This is most common in the context of MENA, 
where dummies are often introduced for Egypt and Israel when the database includes 
these two countries. Most of these studies find these dummies to be positive and 
                                                
2 For an excellent survey and methodological critique of this work see McGillivray and White (1993). 
3 Western aid to Mobuto’s Zaire or Marcos’s Philippines designed to bolster anti-communist pro-
Western regimes are good examples. 
4 Donor interest includes pursuit of commercial interests via the promotion of donor trade or investment 
opportunities by allocating aid to countries most likely to absorb donor exports and investment. It also 
includes the pursuit of political, diplomatic and strategic objectives in order to create an international 
environment, which favours the donor. According to Feeny and McGillivray (2002: 3): ‘This can 
involve allocating aid to countries which are in a strategic geographic location or which have 
particularly close diplomatic ties with the donor. It can even involve rewarding countries for particular 
actions with increased aid or punishing others with reduced or continually low or zero levels of aid’. 
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significant; e.g. Alesina and Dollar (2002); Berthélemy and Tichit (2002); Feeny and 
McGillivray (2002) among many others.5 The Egypt and Israel dummies reflect the fact 
that these two countries are key strategic allies to the West, especially the USA, such 
that donor interest is likely to have a positive influence on aid allocations.  
A recent study (Harrigan and Wang 2011) goes beyond simple dummies for Egypt and 
Israel and makes more country-specific observations regarding the influence of donor 
interest in aid allocations to MENA countries. The study conducts empirical 
investigations based on a large panel dataset. In the base regression, it applies a fixed 
effects model to panel data to analyse the determinants of aid allocations by various 
class of donor (USA, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, UK, and multilateral organizations) 
covering the period 1966-2008 for 138 recipients. The study finds that all the donors 
respond to recipient need in their allocation of aid, but that the USA puts less emphasis 
on this than the other donors with the exception of Japan. It also finds that the USA puts 
more emphasis on donor-recipient linkages than do the other donors suggesting that the 
USA attaches greater importance to issues of donor interest e.g. geopolitical, 
commercial, and other links with specific recipients.  
Of interest to this paper are the results derived from the above study in terms of donor-
recipient fixed effect coefficients for the MENA countries in the sample. These 
coefficients capture the linkages between donor and specific recipients, which include 
long-term strategic relations, economic linkages, colonial ties, etc. Table 2 presents a 
ranking of the ten most favoured recipients for each donor based on the fixed effect 
coefficients. The number of times a North African country appears in these lists is 
noteworthy, given that there were only four North African countries in the sample 
(Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria). Egypt appears as a nation favoured by the 
multilaterals, whilst France favours Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco and Italy favours 
Tunisia and Morocco. The French link with North Africa in terms of aid flows is 
particularly strong, which reflects both past colonial ties and current economic and 
migration ties. 
Table 3 presents a ranking of MENA countries according to the fixed effect coefficients 
for each class of donor. As can be seen from the Table, the North African countries 
appear quite high up on the list for most donors, particularly for the multilaterals, France 
and Italy.  
Another study of aid allocation, which enables conclusions specific to North African 
countries, is that of Collier and Dollar (2002). In their paper they compare the actual 
allocation of aid with an optimal poverty-efficient allocation of aid, with the latter 
assumed to depend on each recipient’s level of poverty, the elasticity of poverty with 
respect to income, and the quality of its policies. Comparing actual 1996 aid allocations 
with the optimum they find that a large number of middle-income countries with poor 
policy receive excessive amounts of aid. As shown in Table 4 the significance of their 
results in the context of North Africa is that all of the North African countries in their 
sample of 59 developing countries should not receive any aid on the poverty-efficient 
criteria. Egypt in particular stands out as a country receiving aid equivalent to 1.31 per 
                                                
5 The US-Egypt dummy parameter in Berthélemy and Tichit’s study was particularly large in the 1980s 
sub-period following the Camp David Peace Accord between Egypt and Israel and the analysis 
suggested the privileged assistance enjoyed by Egypt from the US translated into an aid bonus of 
US$49 per capita. 
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cent of its GDP as opposed to zero per cent under the optimal Collier and Dollar 
allocation. 
Much of the literature on aid allocation suggests that bilateral donors are much more 
susceptible to the influence of donor interest in their aid allocation decisions than the 
multilateral donors (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Rodrik 1995). However, a study of the 
economic and political determinants of IMF and World Bank lending to countries in 
MENA (Harrigan et al. 2006), found that these two important IFIs were not immune to 
the influence of Western powers, particularly the US, when granting programme loans 
to MENA countries. The study identified important reasons why the major Western 
shareholders might be able to influence the flow of funds from the two major 
Washington-based multilaterals. Given its voting power in both the Bank and the Fund, 
the US is in a particularly influential position. A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative analysis leads to the conclusion that both recipient need and donor interest 
influence the granting of IMF and World Bank programme loans to countries of the 
MENA region. The qualitative analysis focused on the five major MENA recipients of 
IMF and World Bank programme loans—Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Tunisia, four of which are in North Africa. Looking at each country’s macroeconomic 
performance in the year in which they commenced their first of a phase of IMF 
programme loans the study finds very little evidence of economic need. Only in the case 
of Jordan in the late 1980s and Egypt in its first phase of loans during the mid-1970s 
was there any clear sign of recipient economic need in terms of a significant 
deterioration in the macroeconomic indicators the IMF is usually concerned with. The 
study argues that other factors explain the IMF and World Bank engagement with Egypt 
in the 1980s and with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. In all cases a cursory political 
analysis indicates that a shift towards a pro-Western foreign policy, peace overtures to 
Israel, domestic political liberalization and the often related challenge to the regime by 
Islamic opposition, prompt an inflow of funds not just from the USA but also from the 
Bank and Fund. For example, important changes in Algeria’s domestic politics and 
foreign policy rather than the state of its macro economy seems to explain the granting 
of a large IMF loan in 1991 and the largest ever World Bank loan to the MENA region 
in 1991 and the 1994 IMF loan.6 Egypt in 1991 received an SDR234 million IMF 
Standby Loan and a US$300 million Bank Structural Adjustment Loan as well as more 
than US$15 billion of debt write off from the West and this seemed to be more related 
to her support for the allies in the first Gulf War than the state of her economy.  
The above findings are further supported by a more formal quantitative analysis. Using 
a Probit model to estimate the determinants of IMF lending in the region Harrigan et al. 
(2006) found that a model that only includes variables representing recipient need 
performs very poorly. However, once foreign policy and political variables are included 
the model performs extremely well. In this supplemented model the only economic 
variables that help to predict whether a MENA country will be granted an IMF loan are 
a change in foreign reserves and total debt service—a decline in reserves or a high debt 
service ratio are good predictors of an IMF programme. Signing a peace treaty with 
Israel improves a country’s chance of a loan as does improving democracy. Related to 
                                                
6 President Benjedid’s political liberalization backfired in 1991 producing unexpected support for the 
Islamic opposition. The country had also recently signed up to the Arab Maghreb Union which was 
committed to preventing the spread of radical Islam and fostering closer links with the West. 
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the latter, the study also found that holding an election is likely to be followed by an 
IMF loan in the post-election year. 
The above types of aid allocation studies have led to the general conclusion that MENA, 
including North Africa, is over-aided. In the words of DFID: 
In comparison with other regions, it (MENA) receives substantially more aid per 
poor person … but poverty reduction is not the primary motivation for many 
donors’ assistance to MENA … aid allocations are substantially influenced by 
donors’ domestic political considerations, including commercial advantage and 
foreign policy objectives such as migration and terrorism. (DFID 2003: 11) 
The fact that both bilateral and multilateral aid flows to North Africa seem to be 
orientated towards middle-income pro-western but repressive regimes that adhere to US 
foreign policy interests in the region suggest that factors other than recipient need are 
influencing global aid allocations. This has two important implications, the first of 
which goes beyond the scope of this paper. First, it may well reduce the developmental 
impact of a scare resource, namely aid. Low-income countries or those that can use aid 
to the best effect may not receive as much aid as wealthier countries or countries with 
weak policies, where aid has been shown to be less effective (Burnside and Dollar 
2000). As Collier and Dollar (2002) have argued a more poverty-efficient allocation of 
aid has the potential to double the number of people lifted out of poverty from 10 to 20 
million.  
Second, the politically motivated flow of funds to North Africa has helped to trigger 
adverse social and political effects (Harrigan and El-Said 2009a; Harrigan and El-Said 
2011; Harrigan 2010). Programme loans from the IMF and World Bank have economic 
liberalization conditions attached to them. Such reform conditions, although they often 
have the potential to bring significant economic gains, may well have negative social 
ramifications in the recipients unless adequate social safety nets are in place. For 
example, reforms such as privatization, removal of state subsidies on foodstuffs, 
devaluation, and trade liberalization can potentially increase unemployment and income 
inequality as well as reduce real incomes of the poor. This, in turn, may lead to the 
growth of anti-reform movements challenging incumbent regimes. There is already 
ample evidence that this has occurred. The 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first 
century have witnessed a rise in the number and forms of distributive conflicts in the 
Arab World, including riots, demonstrations, strikes, violence, assassinations, clashes 
with labour unions and university students in addition to an increase in crime rates 
(Ayubi 1995a, 1995b; Richards and Waterbury 2006; El-Ghonemy 1998; Shafiq 1998; 
The Economist, 5 September 2002).  
More recently, the political events of the first half of 2011, which have witnessed a 
wave of political unrest sweeping MENA, resulting in the downfall of two regimes in 
North Africa—the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, show 
how aid flows to prop up repressive pro-Western regimes can backfire if the aid does 
not deliver sustained pro-poor growth and genuine democracy. We take up this issue of 
aid effectiveness in the next section.  
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4 Aid effectiveness in North Africa 
4.1 Aid and policy reform in North Africa 
In the past three decades a number of countries in North Africa have undertaken 
economic reform programmes with the assistance of both the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Assistance has included both finance from the 
international financial institutions (IFIs) along with policy advice and policy 
conditionality offered to countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. These 
reform programmes have also been supported by complimentary aid flows from other 
multi- and bilateral aid agencies 
It is generally acknowledged that the reform process in North Africa, as with the 
broader MENA region, has been both slow and disappointing in terms of results (Pfeifer 
1999; Nabli 2005; Harrigan and El-Said 2009a; Harrigan 2010; Hammoud 2011). This 
can be attributed to two factors: the local political economy context of the reform 
process and the nature of the relationship between reforming countries and aid donors. It 
is also accepted that the region needs further reform efforts if it is to tackle its acute 
unemployment problem and benefit more fully from the process of economic 
globalization and from the recent movements to enhance democracy in the region. 
Egypt’s economic liberalization process can be traced back to the 1970s when President 
Sadat launched the ‘infitah’ or ‘opening-up’ programme with brief support from the 
IMF, whilst Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, adopted reform initiatives during the 1980s 
with support from both the IMF and World Bank. The development paradigm of the 
IFIs applied in North Africa, has taken the form of fairly standard economic 
liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization programmes (Harrigan and El-Said 
2009a). Standard IMF programmes in the region are focused around stabilizing the 
macro economy. This essentially involves reducing aggregate demand in the economy 
in order to quell inflationary pressures, and reduce the fiscal deficit and balance of 
payments current account deficit. Demand reducing policies have generally consisted of 
a tightening of monetary policy through, for example, credit ceilings and liberalization 
of interest rates combined with fiscal policies to reduce government expenditure and 
increase government revenue and savings. In addition, IMF programmes in the region 
also often involved exchange rate devaluation to overcome the problem of misaligned 
i.e. overvalued, exchange rates. More recently the IMF has shifted its attention to 
reforms of a more structural nature that traditionally had been under the auspices of the 
World Bank. These involve market-orientated economic liberalization designed to boost 
economic growth by increasing the efficiency of economic activity. Reforms include 
privatization of public sector enterprises, price liberalization and deregulation, 
liberalization of the financial sector, trade liberalization, and a down-sizing of the public 
sector, including removal of state subsidies and tax reform to improve the budget.  
Many analysts (Pfeifer 1999; Nabli 2005; Harrigan and El-Said 2009a; Harrigan 2010) 
of the North African reform experience agree that the region has had a degree of success 
with the early IMF stabilization programmes but has made less progress with the 
structural reforms designed to tilt the economy in favour of the private sector as 
opposed to the public sector and the tradable sector as opposed to the non-tradable 
sector: ‘On the macroeconomic stabilization front, the region has achieved a lot … In 
terms of accompanying structural reforms, the results have been more mixed … by and 
large, the pace and intensity of the reform effort has been weak’. (Nabli 2005: 2). 
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Pfeifer (1999) argues that the four countries singled out by the IMF as star performers in 
the MENA region, namely, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco in North Africa along with 
Jordan in the Middle East successfully stabilized their macro economy in the 1990s, 
bringing down inflation, government deficits and balance of payments current account 
deficits. Egypt had a particularly successful stabilization experience in the first half of 
the 1990s (Harrigan and El-Said 2009a: 39–49). In terms of structural reform designed 
to boost export-led economic growth, the region has been less successful with a mixed 
impact. Between 1990-2004 the region experienced patchy economic growth with 
growth spurts in each country which, with the exception of Tunisia (which is discussed 
further in Section 4.5), were not sustained and were partly generated by factors which 
had little to do with the reform effort (ibid.). Much of the growth in Egypt, for example, 
was concentrated in the non-tradables sector of the economy and fuelled by domestic 
demand, especially in the construction sector, and buoyed up by large capital inflows in 
the form of aid flows along with debt relief packages. In addition, again with the 
exception of Tunisia, the growth that did occur in the North African economies tended 
to be extensive (due to factor accumulation) rather than intensive (due to productivity 
gains) (ibid.). In particular, labour productivity remained low in the region reflected in 
low levels of real wages outside the public sector. 
More recently, North Africa, along with the wider MENA region, has experienced a 
period of strong economic growth. Between 2004-06 real average annual GDP growth 
for MENA was around 6.0 per cent (see Table 5), whilst between 2000-10 real average 
annual growth for the region was 4.8 per cent with many North African countries 
averaging growth rates of 4-5 per cent for the period (see Figure 8). Much of this 
growth has come on the back of increasing oil prices, which benefits not just the oil 
exporters of the MENA region, but also the resource-poor countries of the region who 
receive investment, migrant remittances, trade and aid from their oil-rich neighbours. 
The World Bank, however, has argued that some of this growth can be explained by the 
delayed reform dividend: ‘During the last few years, MENA has turned in strong 
economic performances, driven to a large degree by high oil prices and a favourable 
global environment, but also by reform policies that, though gradual, are generally on 
the right track’. (World Bank 2007) 
However, a disaggregation of the growth performance of MENA reveals a slightly 
different picture to that portrayed by the Bank. Much of the recent growth has been 
concentrated in the GCC oil exporters, classified by the Bank as the resource-rich, 
labour-importing countries (see Table 5) who in 2005 and 2006 registered real annual 
GDP growth in excess of 7 per cent. In addition, if we compare the growth performance 
of reformers in the MENA region and some of the North African countries who have 
been reforming under the auspices of the IMF and World Bank, namely, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia with the aggregate MENA regional growth rates it seems that in 
most cases the reformers have been underperforming compared to the region as a whole 
(see Table 6). This casts doubt on how much of the improved growth can be ascribed to 
the dividends of aid supported reform as opposed to the dividends of oil prices. 
There are two reasons why aid-supported reform may have had a disappointing impact 
in North Africa. First, the very slow rate of structural reform in the region: 
‘Implementation of these reform measures has been uneven, hesitant, and incomplete’. 
(World Bank 2003: 3) 
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Second, the fact that the reform programmes themselves, albeit only partially 
implemented, may have been inappropriate. In terms of the first factor, compared to 
regions such as Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe, even perhaps SSA, the pace of 
reform in North Africa has been slow. This can be ascribed to two factors: the political 
economy context in which reforms have been implemented; and the nature of the 
relationships between reforming countries and their aid donors, including the IFIs.  
4.2 The domestic political economy context of reform 
Both prior to and during the reform efforts of the North African economies, the political 
economy of the region is best described as one involving a strong implicit social 
contact, a high level of state intervention in the economy, a corporatist form of 
government in which the state co-opts the business elites and labour unions and a strong 
co-dependency between the state and the private sector. Powerful business elites 
monopolized access to government whilst smaller scale enterprises were largely left to 
fend for themselves. In addition, many economies had rentier characteristics, heavily 
reliant on windfall inflows in the form of oil and oil-related revenues (and other natural 
resources such as gas in Algeria and phosphates in Morocco), migrant remittances and 
aid flows.  
The implicit social contract involved an interventionist government providing a range of 
benefits to different groups in society in return for support for largely undemocratic 
incumbent regimes. Benefits included: subsidies on basic food stuffs, housing, fuel and 
utilities; employment on good terms in the public sector and public sector enterprises; 
free health care and education; and protection against imports and favoured contracts 
with government for the business elite. In addition, the development paradigm followed 
by the post-independence North African states included: a concern for redistribution and 
equity in economic and social policy; a preference for states over markets in managing 
the economy; import substituting industrialization; the use of state planning; state 
provision of welfare and services to most of the population; and a vision of politics 
centred around nation state building rather than competitive politics (World Bank 2003: 
2). This development model has been described as one with a strong interventionist-
redistributive orientation (Richards and Waterbury 2006). While many other states in 
the developing world adopted similar policies in the post-independence period, North 
Africa and MENA as a whole was exceptional outside the communist bloc for the scope 
of state regulation of the economy and the extent to which state welfare policies were 
used as an instrument of redistribution (Yousef 2004). 
The above political economy model reaped dividends between 1940-70 with rapid 
improvements in social welfare, equity and poverty and healthy rates of economic 
growth which exceeded most regions apart from East Asia and the Pacific region. 
However by the late 1970s and early 1980s the model came under strain. As sources of 
economic rent started to decline in the 1980s, with a fall in oil prices, migrant 
remittances and aid and deep recession in the West, the North African economies 
struggled to meet the expectations of their rapidly growing populations. By the end of 
the 1980s the strains had become a major economic crisis for most countries. The 
subsequent reforms which were advocated by the World Bank and the IMF represented 
a major challenge to the political economy model that had become firmly established in 
the region: ‘The social contracts established in the post-independence era have given 
rise to enduring institutions, interests, norms and practices—structuring the constraints 
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and incentives governments now face as they contend with demands for and against 
policy reform’. (World Bank 2003: 1-2) 
The poor were threatened by the removal or reduction of food subsidies; the urban 
population by the reduction of subsidies on fuel, housing and utilities; the elite labour 
force was faced with job losses in the public sector as the government limited 
recruitment and privatized state enterprises; the favoured business elite was faced with a 
removal of protection on competing imports and loss of favoured contracts with the 
government. Carrying out a rapid economic liberalization programme that threatened 
vested interests in society also threatened the legitimacy of incumbent regimes. The 
primacy of the political economy context has led many to argue that economic 
performance in the North Africa region can best be explained, not by issues of culture 
and claims of exceptionalism, but by the interplay of politics and economics and state-
society relations (Vandewalle 1996). 
As a result many governments in the region, although they signed up to IMF and World 
Bank programmes of reform in return for financial support, were reluctant to implement 
the reform programmes. An enduring feature of reform in the MENA region has been 
its slow and hesitant pace compared with other developing and transitional regions. This 
is reflected by a comparison of indicators between MENA and other regions in 2005. 
Weighted average tariffs in MENA at 15 per cent were well above those in East Asia 
(9.4 per cent), Europe and Central Asia (7.0 per cent), Latin America (10.6 per cent) and 
even SSA (13.0 per cent). Non-oil exports accounted for only 8 per cent of GDP (with 
the exception of Tunisia) compared with an average of 27 per cent among low- and 
middle-income economies. FDI inflows into the region were only 0.7 per cent of GDP 
compared to 2.5-3.0 per cent in most other developing regions and the public sector 
continued to account for 33 per cent of employment well above that of East Asia (9 per 
cent excluding China) and Latin America (13 per cent). In addition, MENA countries 
ranked below all other regions apart from SSA in overall rankings for ease of doing 
business (Nabli 2005: 2). 
Obviously there are nuanced differences between the political economy structures of the 
various countries that make up the North Africa region, and some have progressed 
further than others with their reform efforts. In Morocco, for example, reforms have 
progressed fairly quickly compared with many other countries in the region. This can be 
explained by the fact that those who benefited from many of the reforms were wealthy 
industrialists, rural notables in rain-fed agriculture and the beneficiaries of large-scale 
irrigation projects, all of whom were staunch supporters of the monarchy. Traditionally, 
the opponents of the monarchy were organized labour, petty functionaries and school 
teachers and they tended to be harmed by many of the reform efforts but were not 
politically strong enough to oppose them. By contrast Arab socialist republics like 
Egypt have found it politically much harder than the monarchies to reform. This is 
because the regime’s power base tends to be government and state enterprise 
employees, bureaucrats, party political hacks and the business elite. They all tended to 
be threatened by reform and hence the Mubarak regime was, until very recently, slow to 
carry out economic liberalization. 
Despite the nuanced differences, a common assessment is that the reforms actually 
undertaken can be seen as a process whereby the state, rather than retreating from 
economic activity, simply repositions itself to safeguard the positions of its major 
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interest groups (Knowles 2011; Demmelhuber 2011). Richards and Waterbury (2006) 
likewise explain many of the reform efforts as part of a strategy of regime survival. 
4.3 Relations with aid donors and the IFIs 
A second explanation of the slow pace of reform in North Africa centres on the 
relationship between reforming governments and both their aid donors and in particular 
the two Washington-based international financial institutions. This has two related 
dimensions. First, the geopolitics of aid flows to the region, and second the leverage 
capacity of the IMF and World Bank to secure policy reform in the region. 
It has already been argued in Section 3 that the granting of policy-based reform loans by 
the IMF and World Bank was influenced by geopolitical considerations. This has meant 
that both organizations tended to be lax when it came to monitoring reform 
implementation. Hence, recipient governments were able to get away with high levels of 
slippage in the reform agenda. Of all the countries in North Africa where geopolitics 
and Western foreign policy have influenced the flow of funds, Egypt stands out as the 
most significant. For the past two and a half decades the officials of the IMF and World 
Bank knew that compliance rates with reform conditions were very low yet Western 
funds continued to flow into Cairo. 
A second factor that has influenced reform in the region is the lack of Bank and Fund 
leverage over policy reform. This is not just a self-imposed lack of leverage due to the 
desire to prop up pro-Western regimes with loans, but also due to the more general 
picture of aid flows into the region. The easy access to geopolitically and commercially 
orientated aid flows—with Egypt for example receiving huge amounts of aid from the 
USA and European aid to North African countries like Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—
increasing rapidly over the past decade means that ready access to alternative sources of 
funds on concessional terms makes North African countries both able and willing to 
violate the conditions of IMF and World Bank loans without being fearful of 
consequences in the form of loan disruption. Harrigan and El-Said (2009a) provide 
detailed case studies of declining bank leverage in the last decade and a half in both 
Egypt and Morocco.  
A more recent phenomenon which has reduced the leverage of the Bank and the Fund in 
the MENA region is the recovery of oil prices and the region’s ability to ride out the 
global recession. This has boosted growth in the region and removed the pressure to 
reform (Nabli 2005: 2). 
4.4 The social and political implications of economic reform 
To the extent that economic liberalization has been implemented in North Africa, it has 
challenged the old implicit social contract embedded in the region’s political economy 
without replacing it with a new social contract. This has meant that in some cases 
economic liberalization has been accompanied by worsening social welfare and poverty. 
Harrigan and El-Said (2009b) have analysed the social impact of reform in three North 
African reformers, namely, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well as in Jordan. They 
find that the social impact of reform has been mixed and varies over time. Generally, 
however, periods of IMF austerity in the region have led to increased poverty and 
unemployment, whilst brief bursts of growth in the 1980s and 1990s—such as in 
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Morocco between 1985 and the early 1990s and in Egypt in the second half of the 
1990s—led to poverty reduction via labour-intensive growth. However, growth was not 
sustained and as it collapsed poverty again increased in both countries. In Egypt for 
example, the recession of 2000-04 and the effects of devaluation and subsidy reduction 
on prices all led to an increase in poverty.  
The events of the Arab Spring in early 2011, with political unrest sweeping North 
Africa, clearly indicate that aid has not been effective in helping regimes satisfy the 
aspirations of their citizens. In recent years North Africa has experienced satisfactory 
rates of economic growth and has weathered the global recession well. As shown in 
Figure 8, economies in the region grew on average by 4-5 per cent a year in real terms 
between 2000 and 2010. These figures compare favourably with those of regions with 
similar income levels (Hakimian 2011), with the growth rate of Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the same period averaging only 3.4 per cent. However, the last decade of 
growth in North Africa did not take the form of labour-intensive pro-poor growth with 
benefits trickling down to the masses. Rather, in many countries poverty, 
unemployment and income inequality has worsened over the past decade. For example, 
in Egypt the poverty headcount increased from 16.7 per cent in 2000 to 21.6 per cent in 
2009 as shown in Table 7, and these figures are likely to be underestimates, partly 
because the national poverty lines underestimate living costs (Sabry 2010). 
Two factors have contributed to increased poverty in North Africa despite healthy 
economic growth. First, high levels of inflation in recent years, driven partly by 
increasing food costs and high levels of unemployment. Although the Western media 
has portrayed the Arab Spring as a predominantly political uprising by populations fed 
up with repressive regimes, there are strong socioeconomic factors underlying the 
discontent, including the rising cost of food (Harrigan 2011) and unemployment.  
The MENA region is one of the most food insecure regions in the world, relying on 
food imports for nearly 50 per cent of its calorie intake (IFPRI 2010). The global 
increase in food prices in 2007-08 and again in the latter part of 2010 and early 2011, 
have contributed to domestic food price increases and widespread unrest in the MENA 
region (Harrigan 2011). For example, living standards in Egypt have been reduced by 
double digit inflation, including food price inflation running at over 20 per cent. This 
affects not just the poor but also the middle classes, who spend a large proportion of 
their incomes on food (the average person in North Africa spends between 35-44 per 
cent of their income on food compared to 7 per cent in the US). 
In addition to declining living standards due to inflation, unemployment is another 
pressing problem in the region. As shown in Figure 9, unemployment in 2010 ranged 
from 8-13 per cent in North African countries. A particular problem is youth 
unemployment, which ranged from 17.6 per cent in Morocco to 29.4 per cent in Tunisia. 
Many of these unemployed youth are high school or university graduates and their 
economic discontent played a major role in the political unrest of the Arab Spring. 
One of the reasons why unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, is so high in 
North Africa is the fact that the region has a demographic profile incorporating a large 
youth bulge combined with the fact that aid flows and reform in the region have failed 
to generate adequate employment generation. Two factors help explain the lack of 
employment creation. First, the failure to generate labour-intensive export-led growth, 
which is reflected in the fact that the MENA region generally has failed to fully 
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participate in the economic globalization of the past three decades, as shown by 
declining trade to GDP ratios and disappointing inflows of DFI (Harrigan and Tilley 
2011). And second, the failure of the private sector to adequately respond to the reform 
effort by creating jobs as public sector employment contracts. Part of the reason for the 
lack of job creation is the unfavourable business environment in North Africa and 
MENA more generally, as illustrated in Table 8 which provides data on the ease of 
doing business, comparing MENA with other regions.7  
Aid to North Africa has clearly done little to help solve the region’s pressing 
socioeconomic problems such as poverty, inequality and unemployment. In addition, 
until very recently, aid flows have contributed to the propping up of autocratic regimes. 
This is reflected by the fact that overall, according to different sources (World Bank; 
Freedom House; Almounsor 2005; Abed and Davoodi 2003; United Nations 2002) 
MENA performed worse on governance, democracy and press freedom indicators than 
other developing countries. In particular the region performed badly in terms of voice 
and accountability and corruption. This is illustrated in Table 9 from the World Bank’s 
World Governance Indicators (WGI) which shows the percentile scores8 for regions in 
terms of the different governance categories. In terms of voice and accountability, the 
North African countries stand out as being particularly poor within the already poor 
MENA region as a whole.  
Table 10 shows the countries of North Africa ranked by political rights and civil 
liberties using the Freedom House rankings and indicates that all score poorly, with only 
Morocco ranked as partly free, and all countries falling below the global average of 3 
for both categories. The data from Freedom House also finds that the MENA region 
continues to be the worst performing region in terms press freedom indicators, with 
particularly low levels of press freedom in Tunisia and Libya. 
The above analysis indicates that the record of aid effectiveness seems poor in North 
Africa. Despite recent economic growth, problems of poverty, declining living 
standards and unemployment persist and until recently donors have willingly supported 
corrupt and autocratic regimes which have resulted in a severe regional freedom deficit. 
These factors, along with the recent spread of the electronic media and satellite 
television, have all contributed to the recent political uprisings. As a result, citizens in 
the region are no longer willing to support corrupt undemocratic regimes that have 
failed to deliver on the social contract over the past two decades.  
4.5 The unusual case of Tunisia and lessons for donors 
It was stated in Section 4.1 that Tunisia is somewhat of an exception amongst the North 
African countries in that it has managed to experience fairly sustained economic growth 
over the past few decades. Indeed, since the adoption of stabilization and structural 
reforms in 1986 under IMF and World Bank auspices, Tunisia has been hailed as a 
                                                
7 The starting a business indicators identify the bureaucratic and legal hurdles an entrepreneur must 
overcome to incorporate and register a new firm: the procedures, time, and cost involved in launching 
a commercial or industrial firm with up to 50 employees and start-up capital of 10 times the 
economy’s per capita gross national income (GNI).  
8 Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries worldwide that rate below the selected country. 
Higher values indicate better governance ratings. Percentile ranks have been adjusted to account for 
changes over time in the set of countries covered by the governance indicators. 
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model student (Pfeifer 1999; Dasgupta et al. 2002; Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis 
2007). The country has never defaulted on its debt repayment, has managed to sustain a 
healthy economic growth rate, has significantly diversified its production base away 
from natural resources, has stabilized its macroeconomic indicators, and substantially 
reduced poverty rates (Lamloun and Hibou 2002). Although aid flows to Tunisia played 
a role in the country’s success, other supporting factors were also important, as well as 
the fact that the country’s aid supported economic reform programme deviated in 
significant ways from the usual IMF and World Bank orthodoxy (Harrigan and El-Said 
2009a: 105–47). 
Important historical, institutional, political and socioeconomic factors underpin 
Tunisia’s recent success with economic diversification and growth. First, prior to the 
launching of the IMF and World Bank supported economic reform programme in 1986, 
the country had already put in place the foundations for economic diversification and 
export-led growth via a partial opening up of the economy under a dirigiste framework. 
From the first development plan launched shortly after independence, the official 
discourse was that the economy would work based on three sectors: state, co-operatives 
and private, where the state was seen as a partner to the private sector providing the 
capital, cadres and infrastructure necessary for private sector development (Bellin 
1991). The regime combined import substituting industrialization along with promotion 
of industrial exports in a manner not dissimilar to the East Asian NICs (Colman and 
Nixson 1994; Kiely 2001), as well as a strong focus on education, social welfare, female 
empowerment and family planning (Bechri and Naccache 2003). The state picked 
winners in the employment-creating transformative industries (textiles, clothing, leather, 
wood, furniture), supported and developed them and when profitable handed them over 
to the private sector (Ben Romdhane 1981). This mixed approach, supported by an 
investment code providing incentives for private initiatives and special advantages to 
exporting firms, helped develop a strong entrepreneurial class and set the foundations 
for successful further liberalization in the 1990s. The fact that economic transformation 
began in the 1970s prior to the IMF and World Bank programmes, and the fact that this 
gradual home-grown and home-owned process of reform continued after 19869 was one 
of the reasons why Tunisian reform has been so successful; i.e. gradualism and 
ownership of the reform process. 
The second historical factor that helped the aid-supported reform programme was the 
fact that Tunisia had a strong and effective bureaucracy. The post-independence 
establishment of the Ecole Nationale d’Administration to provide high-quality training 
for civil servants along with good civil service renumeration and the generally high 
levels of education produced an effective embedded administration with low levels of 
corruption (Bellin 1994). This meant that the administration could effectively bargain 
with the aid donors. Consequently, Tunisia was able to implement a somewhat 
unorthodox economic reform programme, often to the displeasure of the IMF and 
World Bank. For example, in the area of trade liberalization, the government insisted on 
a gradual approach. Inputs to the productive process rather than consumer goods were 
liberalized first and whilst quantitative restrictions were progressively removed tariffs 
                                                
9 Often the gradualism annoyed the IMF and World Bank, but the Tunisian authorities stuck to this 
approach and the Bank and the Fund were forced to compromise and accept it.  
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were often used in their place to protect domestic industry during the transition phase.10 
In addition in 1994 a foreign trade law introduced countervailing duties to protect 
Tunisian producers against import dumping. This gradual transition whereby firms were 
temporarily protected during a transition period is very different from the normal 
method of trade liberalization. Despite the fact that Tunisia still retains relatively high 
levels of tariffs, it is one of the most open economies in the MENA region in terms of 
outcome indicators such as trade to GDP ratios and diversified export performance.11 
One of the reasons Tunisia has performed well in terms of promoting export-led growth, 
is not only an unorthodox trade liberalization programme but also because the state has 
played an active role in promoting a strong industrialization strategy. In 1987, a 
manufacturing investment law was introduced which offered generous investment 
incentives for specific sectors, as well as preferential interest rates and export promotion 
schemes for favoured activities. Aid played an important role in facilitating the state-led 
industrialization strategy via the Mise à Niveau programme which was launched in 
partnership with the European Union and the African Development Bank. The Mise à 
Niveau programme was implemented to help specific manufacture industries and 
service activities to prepare themselves for the increasing competition they faced as a 
result of Tunisia’s Association Agreement with the EU and the ending of the Multi-
Fibre Agreement. The programme offered a comprehensive set of investment incentives 
to help manufacturing industries upgrade managerial and organization structure, 
innovation, training, technology, distribution, marketing, telecommunication and R&D, 
but also to improve infrastructure and institutions. The programme had a strong sectoral 
bias in favour of export sectors focusing on firms that had been performing well in the 
past.  
Despite the support from the EU and ADB, it is interesting to note that the World Bank 
has criticised the programme for supporting selective industrial policy (World Bank 
2000, 2004). The Bank has also argued that the capacity of picking winners was 
undermined by the distortions created in the domestic market through protectionist 
barriers and that there was no guarantee that the sector/firms selected would be those 
with highest growth effect (World Bank 2004). More generally the Bank has argued that 
Tunisia’s pro-export bias led to misallocation of resources and encouraged private debt 
(World Bank 1995). However, a study by Nabli et al. (2005) shows that credit allocation 
in Tunisia has been biased in favour of tradable activities, and in particular tradable 
activities that had been identified as being those in which Tunisia had a comparative 
advantage. As a result the extent of resource misallocation might not be as severe as the 
World Bank suggests.  
Finally, in negotiating with donors, the Tunisian state has been adamant that economic 
liberalization should not jeopardize social welfare. To this effect, government social 
expenditures have been protected and the privatization programme has been gradual 
with measures put into place to ensure that the programme does not increase 
unemployment.  
                                                
10 Provisional complementary duties were introduced in 1991 to protect local firms as they adjusted to 
the removal of quantitative restrictions. These temporary tariffs ranged from 10-30 per cent and were 
meant to last for a maximum of 10 years.  
11 This illustrates the importance of distinguishing between openness in terms of policy measures, such 
as tariff levels, and openness in terms of performance measures, such as exports to GDP.  
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A number of lessons for donors emerge from the Tunisian case study, which are 
relevant to their future dealings with North Africa. First, the need to help promote a 
developmental state, which can be defined as a centralized state in interaction with the 
private sector, and intervening within the economic structure to promote development 
(Wade 1990; Evans et al. 1985). A successful developmental state is one that is capable 
(i.e. with a skilled and well developed bureaucracy), autonomous from dominant 
interests, embedded in society, benefiting from international support, and composed of 
skilful leaders with an ideology of a strong state. Its actions should concentrate on 
capital accumulation and it should be able to ‘pick winners’, i.e. promote efficiently the 
appropriate sectors and industries (Wade 1990). Important state intervention is required, 
and the state should provide discipline within a reciprocal relationship with the private 
sector, while education and knowledge are promoted. Particularly important is the need 
for an active state role in designing and implementing a clear industrialization strategy. 
Cavallo (2002) supports this stance with his argument that important aspects of strong 
government intervention help to explain the Tunisian success.  
The Tunisian government also had ambitious but clear developmental objectives which 
remained relatively consistent, with gradualism and social policy as the core elements of 
the reforms (Bellin 1994). Development objectives remained rooted in open economic 
policies mixed with strong government intervention. The government of Tunisia 
planned the development of the economy from the start, using its control over society 
and the economy together with the promotion of the private sector to reach its 
development (and political) objectives. As a result, the reforms have been implemented 
gradually and have been well sequenced building upon and consolidating past progress. 
Hence there has been little reversal and the reforms have credibility. Gradualism has 
involved the careful phasing of reforms; e.g. liberalizing the import of capital goods and 
intermediate goods and raw materials first, protecting local industries with 
compensatory tariffs for a temporary period when quantitative import restrictions; i.e. 
licences were removed. 
Although we have argued above that historical factors combined with a degree of 
unorthodoxy help explain the Tunisian success, this is not to deny that aid has played an 
important role. Harrigan and El-Said (2009a) detail the vast number of economic 
reforms undertaken in Tunisia with support from the IMF, World Bank and other 
donors, with the country receiving nine World Bank Structural and Sectoral Adjustment 
Loans between 1986 and 2001, various IMF loans as well as support from the EU and 
ADB. Many of these aid-supported reforms have undoubtedly contributed to Tunisia’s 
strong economic performance since the mid-1980s. 
Despite the portrayal of Tunisia as an economic success story, several major problems 
persist and these have contributed to the downfall of the Ben Ali regime during the 
events of the Arab Spring. First, economic growth has been accompanied by a form of 
clientelism whereby a few business families close to the Ben Ali family have 
systematically been benefiting from big contracts and personal favours (for example the 
privatization deals) (Hibou 2006). In addition, while macro fundamentals are right, 
Tunisia’s economy continues to suffer from three important structural weaknesses: low 
levels of private investment, excessively high levels of unemployment and political 
repression. As discussed in the next section of the paper, these problems are not unique 
to Tunisia but characterize the North Africa region more generally and they constitute 
the critical areas that donors need to address in the future. 
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5 Conclusion: the future of aid to North Africa 
The Arab Spring provides an opportune moment to reappraise aid to North Africa. It is 
clear that if future aid flows are to promote genuine political and economic development 
in the region they need to be decoupled from the past donor tendency to support pro-
western regimes regardless of their record on political and socioeconomic development. 
Future aid flows need to focus on three critical areas. First there is an urgent need to 
promote new employment opportunities especially for the youth. With a young 
population and increased female labour force participation it is estimated that by 2020 
the MENA region as a whole will need to create 100 million new jobs to absorb new 
entrants to the labour force and bring down unemployment (World Bank 2003). This 
will entail not only creating a better business environment for the private sector but also 
unravelling the cosy relationship which existed in the past between incumbent regimes 
and the business elites so as to create a more inclusive and competitive system for the 
region’s potential entrepreneurs. In the past it has been too difficult to create business 
opportunities and employment outside of patronage networks and a Leviathan state. In 
addition to providing supporting aid for such a process, there is an urgent need for 
greater opening up of European markets to exports from North Africa, including in 
particular agriculture-based exports.  
Second, given the recent prediction that global food prices are set to double in the next 
twenty years (Oxfam 2011) and given the reliance of the region on global food markets 
and the role played by rising food prices in triggering the Arab Spring (Harrigan 2011) 
aid donors need to look at creative ways in which they can enhance the region’s food 
security (World Bank 2009).  
Finally, there is need for the aid community to help foster the development of genuine 
democracy and accountability in the region, with aid programmes designed to enhance 
civil society, the role of elected legislatures and press freedom. As can be seen by 
comparing Figures 10 and 11, between 2005-09 only a small share of aid to North 
Africa was allocated to ‘governance and civil society’ compared to the much larger 
share allocated to this sector in SSA. Hence, there is clearly scope to refocus the 
sectoral allocation of aid to North Africa to support the development of democracy and 
civil society. 
Whilst the above three areas should be prioritized, at the same time it is essential that 
the governments of North Africa as well as their donors ensure that adequate social 
safety nets are in place and that a rapid shrinking of the state in terms of welfare 
provision does not occur in the name of economic liberalization. 
Not only is there a need to refocus aid programmes to North Africa, but in the 
immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, increased funding is needed to help smooth the 
political transition. North African economies, particularly Tunisia and Egypt, have been 
hit by high inflation, unemployment, loss of tourism revenues, declining exports and 
foreign investment, and declining growth. Egypt for example saw its exports decline by 
40 per cent in February 2011 whilst public spending and the balance of payments deficit 
both increased sharply. As a result the country used up more than 20 per cent of its 
foreign reserves (US$8 billion) between January and April 2011. It is predicted that for 
2011 the Egyptian economy will shrink by 3 per cent and the budget deficit will 
increase to 11 per cent of GDP. In addition, in countries like Algeria, Morocco and 
Egypt, the Arab Spring has encouraged workers and trade unions to become 
increasingly vocal, forcing wage increases with a minimum wage to be introduced in 
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Egypt and Morocco increasing public sector wages. More generally, the IMF has 
estimated that oil-importing Arab nations will need US$160 billion in external financing 
over the next three years.  
There are encouraging signs that the donor community is willing to provide increased 
aid to North Africa to aid the political transition. The G8 meeting in France in May 
2011 pledged over US$20 billion of additional funding for Tunisia and Egypt to be 
delivered by 2013. The money is to be provided by multilateral development banks, 
with the European Investment Bank to contribute one quarter. In addition, the US and 
other OECD countries have also promised additional bilateral resources. At the so-
called Deauville Declaration, G8 leaders said that the political movements of the Arab 
Spring ‘are historic and have the potential to open the door to the kind of transformation 
that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall’. In addition 
to the G8 pledge, the IMF has recently agreed to lend Egypt US$3 billion to help it 
through the crisis whilst the African Development Bank announced a US$500 million 
loan to Tunisia as part of a US$1.4 billion emergency package provided by the World 
Bank, the European Union and the French Government. However, it is important that 
donors do not concentrate their resources just on very broad balance of payments 
support or budgetary support. In the past such an approach has enabled state elites to 
simply get on with business as usual. Instead, more aid needs to be channelled through 
well thought out sector support in areas such as democratization and social protection. 
There are also encouraging signs that the political unrest of the past six months has 
forced the donor community and its critics to reappraise the past nature of aid efforts in 
North Africa. With the wisdom of hindsight, many donors are now admitting that past 
efforts have been disappointing and misguided in their support of the old regimes in 
countries like Egypt and Tunisia. President of the World Bank, Robert Zollick at a 
recent World Bank conference on Arab Voices and Views (21 March 2011) stated ‘Our 
record of action has been spotty. Like others we have much to learn’. The European 
Union also announced in March 2011 that it will revamp its European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) through which it has committed US$18.6 billion in 
aid to MENA. This is in response to criticisms from politicians such as David Cameron 
and think tanks such as Open Europe which claim that the ENPI has failed to deliver 
democracy and development to the region. The think tank has argued that aid needs to 
foster greater transparency, accountability, civil liberties and human rights in the region 
as well as promoting greater economic liberalization and regional trade. The EU has 
issued a new communication on Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with 
the Southern Mediterranean in which it has committed to refocus US$5.5 billion in 
grants for the period 2011-13 towards democratic transformation, institution building, 
support to civil society and youth, and economic development and job creation. The 
European Investment Bank has also voiced readiness to lend more support to 
democratic transition in North Africa and to prioritize projects that create youth 
employment. In response the European Parliament voted in February 2011 to increase 
by €1 billion the EIB’s lending ceiling for infrastructure and small and medium 
enterprise development in the Mediterranean until the end of 2013. 
Likewise, the African Development Bank’s President Donald Kaberuka has stated that 
the ADB will ‘completely’ review its aid programme and strategy in North Africa and 
will focus assistance in the future on projects that promote job creation, poverty 
reduction and reduced social exclusion. The ADB has already pledged an extra US$2 
billion to Tunisia which will be focused on development of agricultural industries and 
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small and medium-sized businesses which the Bank believes are ‘high multipliers for 
job creation’. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the new aid flows to countries like Egypt and 
Tunisia, albeit accompanied by rhetoric on democratization, simply accelerate the 
neoliberal economic agenda of the past which will consolidate and reinforce the power 
of the dominant classes, such as the military and business elite, rather than supporting 
the interests of the masses involved in the uprisings. Hanieh (2011) has argued that 
there are already worrying signs that this may be the case. He states that the World 
Bank’s flagship report of 2009 ‘From Privilege to Competition: Unlocking Private-led 
Growth in the Middle East and North Africa’ favours opening up sectors to foreign 
investors, liberalizing foreign trade, removing protection of state-owned firms, 
eliminating the anti-export bias and promoting privatization. This hardly differs from 
the neoliberal agenda of the past few decades which, as we have shown above, has 
failed to produce pro-poor growth. Hanieh (2011) has argued that although many of the 
demands of the recent uprisings suggest a strong dissatisfaction with the way capitalism 
has been promoted in the region, new aid flows look like furthering the neoliberal 
agenda, particularly through the promotion of privatization via Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPIs). For example, President Obama’s promise of US$1 billion of relief 
on debt owed to the USA by Egypt was tied to conditions such as ‘integrating 
competitive markets’ whilst at the same time US$1 billion in new investment was 
promised via the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The objective of 
OPIC is to promote US investment in emerging markets partly via accelerating 
privatization and OPIC has stated that this will occur in Egypt via PPIs. Likewise 
Hanieh argues that the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is 
contemplating extending its activities to Egypt by providing €1 billion to encourage 
privatization and PPI initiatives.  
Tellingly, under pressure from activists, the Egyptian finance ministry announced on 24 
June that it would reject the IMF and World Bank offer of new loans totalling US$6 
billion, due to conditionalities, including privatization and PPI initiatives, but not before 
budget cuts under IMF advice of US$4.6 billion, including a 50 per cent cut to 
unemployment benefit and reductions in energy subsidies (Hanieh 2011).  
In summary, a scenario of rapid privatization and neoliberalism along with restrictions 
on the state’s ability to protect the poor does not augur well for the ability of the new 
regimes of North Africa to meet the aspirations of their citizens. The old orthodox 
World Bank and US approach to the region is ill-equipped to deal with the current 
challenges in countries such as Egypt.12 Instead, much could be learnt from the 
Tunisian experience with reform discussed above. As argued in Section 4.5, Tunisia 
over the past two decades provides an alternative development strategy to the excesses 
of neoliberalism. In a manner not dissimilar to the old East Asian model, Tunisia has 
                                                
12 This conclusion is supported by Addison and Baliamoune-Lutz (2006), who empirically analyse the 
relationship between economic liberalization and institutional quality in the Maghreb. They argue that 
trade liberalization and financial sector reform may have unintended negative effects if carried out 
during a time of transition from low institutional quality to partial improvement, partly because the 
associated uncertainty can lead to a muted investment response to reform leading to unemployment 
and income loss. This seems very pertinent to the current situation in the Maghreb and suggests that 
overhasty and zealous economic liberalization applied in classic IMF and World Bank models may 
not be appropriate at a time of gradual transition to genuine democracy with the simultaneous 
requirement of gradual institutional strengthening. 
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diversified her export base and generated labour-intensive growth whilst maintaining 
high levels of public expenditure on social welfare. This has been done, not via rapid 
liberalization, but via selection and protection of key industries which have benefited 
from state support and directed finance. In addition, a strong state has regulated and 
controlled the privatization process in a manner which has protected workers’ and 
consumers’ interests. Although this was not enough to prevent the overthrow of the Ben 
Ali regime or to prevent high levels of youth unemployment, it did help produce one of 
the most successful countries in the MENA region in terms of sustained economic 
growth, economic diversification and improvements in social welfare (Harrigan and El-
Said 2009b). The reappraisal of aid flows to the region needs to take on board the 
Tunisia experience and avoid the promotion of excessive economic liberalization that 
simply supports the entrenched vested interests of the existing elites. 
It also remains to be seen whether the reassessment of aid to North Africa by the donor 
community will genuinely shake free of the excessive influence of donor interest in the 
aid allocation process to the region, which has done much to undermine aid 
effectiveness in the past. The acid test will come if countries such as Tunisia and Egypt 
elect new governments which do not display the same pro-Western tendencies as their 
predecessors. 
Finally, it is important that both donors and the new regimes of North Africa do not see 
foreign aid either as the main cause of past disappointing performance or as a future 
panacea for the region’s socioeconomic and political difficulties. Although North Africa 
has the highest level of aid per capita, aid flows as a percentage of GDP and as a 
percentage of government expenditure are very low. In the past, for example, migrant 
labour remittance flows have often made a much greater contribution to these 
economies than aid. Hence, opening up Western economies to both trade and migrant 
labour flows from North Africa are likely to be more important than aid flows 
particularly in dealing with the region’s pressing unemployment problem.  
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Figure 1: Net ODA disbursements by region 1980-2009 
 
 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Net aid per capita by region 1960-2009 
 
 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
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Figure 3: Total ODA to MENA income groups 1980-2009 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
Figure 4: ODA disbursements to North African countries 1980-2009 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
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Figure 5: Total ODA to MENA by donor 1980-2007 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
Figure 6: Multilateral and bilateral aid to North Africa and MENA 1980-2009 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
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Figure 7: European and American aid to the Middle East and North Africa regions 1985-2009 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
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Figure 8: Real annual average GDP growth rates, % 
 
 
Source: Hakimian (2011) Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 9: Unemployment rates, % 2010 
 
  
Note: Youth unemployment is for those aged 15-25 years. 
Source: Hakimian (2011) Figure 1. 
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Figure 10: Aid Allocations to North Africa by Sector 2005-09 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
 
 
Figure 11: Aid allocations to SSA by sector 2005-09 
 
 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
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Table 1: European versus US shares of total ODA to North Africa 1980-2009 
 US European Union European bilateral European total 
1980-89 37% 4% 32% 36% 
1990-99 28% 11% 37% 48% 
2000-09 17% 24% 45% 69% 
Source: OECD DAC database. 
 
 
Table 2: List of countries with largest fixed-effect coefficients  
 
 Multilateral 
aid 
USA Canada France Italy Japan UK 
 Most favoured recipients 
 Turkey Grenada St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
Mali Tunisia Malaysia St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
 Viet Nam Cyprus Seychelles Tunisia Morocco India Grenada 
 Ethiopia Bahamas Guyana Madagascar Turkey Pakistan Vanuatu 
 South Africa Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Belize Algeria Indonesia Korea Bermuda 
 Brazil Seychelles St. Lucia Cameroon Mozambique China Belize 
 Indonesia Israel Grenada French 
Polynesia 
Ethiopia Sri Lanka Antigua and 
Barbuda 
 Egypt St. Kitts-
Nevis 
Bermuda Senegal India Bangladesh Kiribati 
 Pakistan Micronesia Barbados Morocco Argentina Thailand Dominica 
 Bangladesh Marshall 
Islands 
St. Kitts-
Nevis 
New 
Caledonia 
Brazil Philippines Seychelles 
 India Palau Dominica Côte d’Ivoire Egypt Indonesia St. Kitts-
Nevis 
s.d. 2.077 3.516 2.057 2.391 2.729 1.947 3.312 
US -0.745       
Canada -0.503 0.760      
France 0.675 -0.633 -0.391     
Italy 0.792 -0.550 -0.358 0.611    
Japan 0.573 -0.471 -0.397 0.301 0.282   
UK -0.702 0.802 0.793 -0.635 -0.572 -0.440  
 
Source: Harrigan and Wang (2011: Table 2). 
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Table 3: Rankings of MENA countries according to fixed-effect coefficients  
 
 Multilateral Aid USA Canada France Italy Japan UK 
M
os
t f
av
ou
re
d 
to
 L
ea
st
 fa
vo
ur
ed
 
C
ou
nt
rie
s 
Egypt Israel Lebanon Morocco Egypt Egypt Jordan 
Turkey Jordan Jordan Algeria Turkey Jordan Lebanon 
Morocco Lebanon Tunisia Tunisia Morocco Morocco Iraq 
Sudan Iraq Israel Egypt Tunisia Turkey Sudan 
Algeria Egypt Morocco Lebanon Algeria Yemen Yemen 
Tunisia Tunisia Iraq Turkey Lebanon Tunisia Tunisia 
Yemen Morocco Egypt Syria Sudan Syria Turkey 
Lebanon Turkey Algeria Yemen Iraq Sudan Israel 
Syria Yemen Sudan Jordan Iran Iran Egypt 
Jordan Sudan Turkey Sudan Jordan Algeria Syria 
Iraq Syria Yemen Iran Yemen Lebanon Algeria 
Iran Algeria Syria Iraq Syria Israel Iran 
Israel Iran Iran Israel Israel Iraq Morocco 
s.d. 1.104 3.488 1.882 1.486 1.467 1.767 1.930 
 
Source: Harrigan and Wang (2011: Table 3). 
 
Table 4: Optimal versus actual 1996 aid allocation in selected North African countries  
Country  Poverty-efficient allocation Actual aid 
Egypt 0.0 1.31 
Morocco 0.0 0.70 
Tunisia 0.0 0.29 
Algeria 0.0 0.22 
 
Source: Collier and Dollar (2002: Table 3), (in % of GDP). 
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Table 5: GDP and per capita income growth, (1996-2006) 
 
Country group 1996-99 2000-03 2004 2005 2006 
  Average Average    
 MENA region      
Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 4.6 5.9 5.9 6.3 
GDP per capita 1.7 2.6 3.9 4 4.2 
 Resource-poor, labour abundant     
Real GDP growth (%) 4.7 3.9 4.8 3.8 5.6 
GDP per capita 2.7 2 3.1 2.1 3.6 
 Resource-rich, labour abundant     
Real GDP growth (%) 3.8 5 4.9 4.6 4.3 
GDP per capita 1.9 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.5 
 Resource-rich, labour importing     
Real GDP growth (%) 3.3 4.7 6.9 7.5 7.5 
GDP per capita 0.4 1.5 3.6 4.2 4.2 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
Table 6: Reformers real GDP growth rates (1996-2006) 
Countries 1996-99 2000-03 2004 2005 2006 
  Average Average    
MENA region 3.60 4.60 5.90 5.90 6.30 
Reformers simple average 4.16 4.06 5.82 3.76 4.06 
Egypt 5.20 3.80 4.20 4.60 6.90 
Morocco 4.20 4.00 4.20 1.70 7.30 
Tunisia 5.90 4.20 6.00 4.20 5.30 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
Table 7: Poverty headcount in Egypt 
 2000 2005 2010 
Poverty headcount 
ratio, urban 
9.3 10.1 11.0 
Poverty headcount 
ratio, rural 
22.1 26.8 28.9 
Poverty headcount 
ratio, total 
16.7 19.6 21.6 
 
Source: Sabry (2010). 
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Table 8: Ease of doing Business Indicators 2008 
Region or economy Procedures (number) Duration (days) 
Cost (% GNI per 
capita) 
OECD 6 14.9 5.1 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 8.8 26.2 11.1 
South Asia 7.6 33.4 40.7 
Middle East & North Africa 9.7 38.5 66 
East Asia & Pacific 8.7 46.8 34.7 
SSA 10.8 56.3 148.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 9.8 68.3 43.6 
Mean  8.8 40.6 49.9 
 
Source: World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Survey http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
Table 9: World governance indicators: regional average percentile ranks (0-100) 
 
Voice and 
accountability 
Political 
stability 
Government 
effectiveness 
Regulatory 
quality 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Control of 
corruption Average 
MENA 23.7 35.7 44.9 45.2 49.6 50.7 41.6 
Caribbean 67.5 66.8 67.8 64.8 64 67.9 66.5 
East Asia 49.4 59.7 48.1 45.2 54.9 45.2 50.4 
Eastern 
Europe & 
Baltics 
64 55.1 62 68.1 54.4 56.9 
60.1 
FSU 21.2 32.8 27.4 30.4 21.4 20.6 25.6 
Latin America 51.6 36.6 43.9 46.1 33.9 44 42.7 
OECD 91.4 81.4 88.7 91.1 90.3 90.5 88.9 
South Asia 28 19.3 36.5 31.9 38.3 33.9 31.3 
SSA 33.2 34.2 26.8 27.8 28.3 30.7 30.2 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2008). 
Table 10: North Africa political rights and civil liberties  
Country Political rights Civil liberties Status 
Morocco 5 4 PF 
Algeria 6 5 NF 
Egypt 6 5 NF 
Libya 7 7 NF 
Tunisia 7 5 NF 
 
Note: Rankings are from 1-7, with 1 being the best ranking. PF = partially free, NF = not free. 
 
 Source: Freedom House (2008). 
